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Prime Minister Nehru, a Kashmiri Hindu Pandit, once said that “the people of the Indian 
subcontinent, despite a variety of languages, castes, and races, shared an overarching historical 
and cultural experience and had common racial roots in the different regions that made them all 
uniquely Indian. Where religion may separate them, language, race and culture also united them” 
(Thomas, 2004).  This was true for much of India’s history as an independent nation, despite 
regular outbreaks of communal tension. However, Kashmir’s identity crisis began before  The 
last maharaja (ruler) of Kashmir, Hari Singh, spent millions of rupees on his coronation and also 
placed “outsiders” in his government (Schofield, 2003). The Kashmiri Pandits led a campaign 
called “Kashmiris for Kashmir”, which led to the Hereditary State Subject Law, forbidding the 
employment of non-state subjects in public services and purchase of land (Schofield, 2003). 
After this law was passed, Kashmiri Pandits and people from Jammu were recruited for such 
government positions, angering the Muslim Kashmiris (Schofield, 2003). Additionally, Kashmiri 
Muslims were not permitted to own firearms or be in the military (Schofield, 2003). Despite the 
differences between the Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims, they were still able to find common 
ground and fight the autocratic rule of Hari Singh’s autocracy (Schofield, 2003). Today, the 
Pandits and Muslims have been conditioned to be hostile towards the other, but this has not 
always been the case. Despite the alliance between Kashmiri Pandits and Muslims in the past, 
Kashmiri Muslims today find it difficult to feel a connection to the rest of the country and their 
own state as the only Muslim majority state in the nation. Muslim Kashmiris are not only 
separated by religion, but also language and culture, as they identify more with Pakistan’s 
history. In 1949, the maharaja (ruler) of Jammu and Kashmir had several choices: accede to 
India, accede to Pakistan, or pursue independent statehood. He chose to accede to India in 
 3 
 
exchange for military assistance in a skirmish between Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir,  
However, he did so under the condition that the state would receive special status with the 
creation of Article 370 of the Constitution. This article allows for “the state to have its own 
constitution, a separate flag and independence over all matters except foreign affairs, defence 
[sic], and communications” (BBC News, 2019). In sum, the appeal of this agreement would be 
that Kashmir could maintain local autonomy while also receiving support from the Indian 
government. Kashmir is also geographically separated from India by a valley, and the rest of the 
state, Jammu, by some of the tallest mountains in the world. Socially and physically isolated 
from the rest of the country, it is clear that the treatment of the state of Jammu and Kashmir is 
markedly different from the rest of the state, demonstrated by the lack of fair and free elections 
and democratic processes that other states are granted within India.  
This paper will explore the ethnic mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims against the state of 
India, with the assistance of Pakistan, the reasons behind ethnic mobilization, and the insurgency 
that ensues as a result of the oppression Kashmir had faced. Using varying hypotheses from 
scholars in the field of ethnic relations, we refute the idea that ethnicity causes civil war and 
explore other potential factors for conflict and instead view geography and political mobilization 
as key factors of conflict. My hypothesis is that ethnicity is not politically salient until it is 
mobilized by an outside actor, particularly one within close proximity to the ethnic group. We 
will use the case study of Kashmir to apply to this hypothesis.  
METHODOLOGY 
This paper aims to address the role that ethnicity has in conflict. I postulate that ethnicity is not 
formed on its own and that it takes an outside actor, particularly a political entrepreneur, to 
mobilize a group to recognize their identity as an ethnicity. It is especially important that we 
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consider the proximity of the political entrepreneur to the ethnic group in question; for example, 
the role that Pakistan played in Kashmir’s ethnic mobilization. Pakistan shares a border and 
common religion (Islam) with Kashmir, creating a physical sense of closeness as well as a deeper 
bond through religion. I refute the primordialist viewpoint that is common in past literature, 
which refers to the idea that ethnicity is not created and remains stagnant. I argue from a 
constructivist viewpoint that ethnicity is created through motivations by outside actors to gain 
political power. More specifically, I argue that geographic location also plays a role in ethnic 
mobilization.  
 I use James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin’s hypotheses from “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and 
Civil War” to compare the factors that they believe play a role in the relationship between 
ethnicity and conflict to the case of Kashmir. Through this qualitative approach, I analyzed 
several of their hypotheses that were most relevant to my analysis of Kashmir: 1) “measures of a 
country’s ethnicity or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war”; 2) 
“countries with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at a greater risk for civil 
war”; 3) “the presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly served by roads at a distance from the centers 
of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, 
cross-border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that can be induced not to denounce the 
insurgents to government agents”; and 4) “the political and military technology of insurgency 
will be favored, and thus civil war made more likely, when potential  rebels face or have 
available the following”: a newly independent state, political instability, a mic of democracy and 
autocracy, a large country population, and foreign government support.  (Fearon and Laitin, 
2003).  Their paper serves as a platform for my own research as they are two of the leading 
scholars in the field and have done extensive work on the relationship between ethnicity and 
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conflict. I will use their hypotheses and other research throughout this paper to form my case 
study on Kashmir.  
 Using the two main theoretical lenses of ethnicity, the primordialist and constructivist 
views, I contest the legitimacy of the primordialist argument and instead promote the 
constructivist view as most important in understanding ethnic relations. Primordialism operates 
under the idea that ethnicity simply exists and conflict is bound to happen as a result of inherent 
differences. The constructivist view, on the other hand, views ethnicity as an identity that is 
mobilized for a specific reason and can change over time based on events and experiences the 
group faces. However, understanding both the primordialist and constructivist view is crucial in 
understanding ethnic relations as the former explains the prevailing theories of the past that 
attempted to understand ethnicity, and the latter helps us to understand the complexity of 
ethnicity that previously went unnoticed.  
 I chose the case study of Kashmir because it has been involved in conflict for its entire 
existence, yet people are just starting to pay attention to it today. Identifying the root cause of the 
problem in Kashmir, which has a majority Muslim population and a minority Hindu (Kashmiri 
Pandit), while this is reversed for the entire country of India. Because the current Indian 
government is run by the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) that operates on a “Hindu-first” agenda, it 
is easy to follow primordialist thinking and believe that the issues stem from ethnic and religious 
differences. Rather than take the conflict for what it is on the surface, I chose to study the history 
of Kashmir, the terse and contentious relationship between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, and 
the ethnic mobilization of the Kashmiri Muslims. By starting with the beginning and working up 
towards today’s conflict in Kashmir, we use a constructivist lens to evaluate the salience of 
ethnicity over time.  
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 The main limitation in this study is the continuing development of the situation in 
Kashmir. Every day, there is new information regarding updates on Indian occupancy of 
Kashmir and it is impossible to predict what may come next. Though we may not have the full 
timeline of events yet, analyzing the information we have now provides us with another useful 
case study that explains the salience of ethnic mobilization in present day India and Kashmir. In 
the following theory section, we will discuss definitions of key terms as well as previously used 
case studies to analyze ethnic mobilization. 
THEORY 
 
A political party by definition is a group of people that organize themselves to gain 
power, and when the party is formed on the basis of identity, specifically ethnicity, the party’s 
interests will be more focused on gain for the ethnic group (Duverger, 1959). Ethnicity is a form 
of identity that is rooted in historical, cultural, and geographical relations which include 
attributes that can be 
acquired genetically (e.g. skin color, hair type, eye color, height, and physical 
features), through cultural and historical inheritance (e.g. name, language, place 
of birth, and origins of one’s parents and ancestors) or in the course of one’s 
lifetime as markers of such an inheritance (e.g. last name or tribal markings) 
(Seymour and Cunningham, 2016). 
 
An ethnic party, then, limits its reach to its own ethnic constituency and does “not pursue 
universalistic programs but rather seeks to secure material and political benefits for the ethnic 
group” (Seymour and Cunningham Gallagher, 2016). 
Almost every nation in the world identifies as ethnically heterogenous, with the exception 
of Japan, Korea, and several Scandinavian countries, yet there are few cases where heterogeneity 
leads to violence. James D. Fearon makes the distinction between ethnicity being socially 
relevant and being politically mobilized. When ethnicity is socially relevant, ethnic distinctions 
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condition people’s actions in their daily life; but when ethnicity is politicized, access to political 
benefits is dependent on one’s ethnicity (Fearon, 2004). Fearon’s definitions of social relevance 
and political mobilization can partially help us to understand why conflicts may arise between 
ethnic groups, but not why ethnic groups are mobilized in the first place.  
Under certain circumstances, ethnicity becomes politically mobilized for several reasons, 
but one of the more common theories is for economic reasons, which can be divided into two 
sub-categories: grievances and greed. Economic grievance is the idea that “economic disparity, 
as captured by differential rates of poverty between any two ethnic, religious, or socioeconomic 
groups of people, would directly result in conflicts over resources” (Ishiyama 2009). When there 
are clear disparities between two identity groups, communal conflict is more likely to break out 
amongst the two groups. Economic greed, on the other hand, is the theory touted by Paul Collier, 
James Fearon, and David Laitin that  
the availability of resources provides an incentive for “greed” that in turn 
provides incentives to engage in conflict…a most important risk factor is that 
countries that have a substantial share of their income (Gross Domestic Product 
[GDP]) coming from the export of primary commodities are radically more at 
risk of conflict (Ishiyama, 2009). 
 
The other argument that many ethnicity scholars make is that political entrepreneurs capitalize 
on the wants and needs of one ethnic group, mobilize the group into a voting bloc, and pursue 
their interests to gain traction as a party. In order to mobilize an ethnic group, the political 
entrepreneur must ensure that the ethnic group is 1) large enough to be politically salient and 2) 
that the group strongly aligns themselves with their ethnic background (Posner, 2003). If the 
group does not have many identifying members, they will be politically irrelevant within the 
government and will not be able to gain enough traction to be successful. Another possibility is 
that while the group may have a lot of identifying members, their ethnicity may not be as 
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important to them as other aspects of politics or their identity. Without both components present 
in a politically mobilized ethnic group, the party will be inconsequential. To distinguish between 
social relevance and political mobilization, Posner provides examples from a case study in 
Zambia and Malawi.  
To provide a comparison of socially relevant and politically mobilized ethnic groups, 
consider the case of the Chewas and Tumbukas in Malawi and in Zambia. Posner explains the 
difference between the groups in each nation: in Zambia, the Chewas and Tumbukas are 
mobilized under the political bloc of “Easterners”, allowing the two ethnic groups to work 
together towards common goals. In Malawi, ethnic groups are mobilized and seen as distinctly 
different from the others, whereas the Chewas and Tumbukas have no perceivable discrimination 
or hostility towards the other in Zambia. While the two major ethnic groups in Zambia are not 
politically mobilized, the two groups are still socially relevant. Zambians have a greater sense of 
nationality than they do ethnic identity which is because the government prioritized creating a 
neutral language and identity, but still allowed for other languages and cultures to be accepted 
outside of politics. Unlike Zambian Chewas and Tumbukas, Malawian Chewas and Tumbukas 
recognize the other group as distinctively different, and they acknowledge that there are ethnic 
markers that distinguish them from one another.  
When people feel that their identity is being threatened by another group, they may try to 
mask the traits that distinguish them from others to protect themselves. However, ethnic identity 
can be a difficult thing to disguise, considering some ethnic markers are physical. Ethnic 
markers, according to Seymour and Cunningham, serve two purposes:  
the stronger the ethnic markers that distinguish members of a group from its rival, 
the more easily members of one group can be singled out for discriminatory 
treatment by the members of the rival group; and second, the stronger those 
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markers, the less likely are assimilation and the more likely conflict between the 
groups (Seymour and Gallagher Cunningham, 2016).  
 
Because ethnicity can have physically distinguishable differences from others, ethnic groups can 
be differentiated more easily from one another than any other identity group.  
Decisions are made based on the perceived power their group has; for example, if a 
majority ethnic group feels that they are threatened by immigration, they will identify with a 
nationalist view to protect their ethnic interests. However, if a minority ethnic group feels 
threatened by a majority ethnic group, they may choose to hide that part of themselves to avoid 
persecution. In politics, people use these identities to guide their voting decisions. Identity 
politics is defined as people that vote in the interest of what their strongest identity is, whether 
that be race, class, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, gender, or any other number of 
things. When choosing a candidate, people who have a strong sense of identity will opt to elect a 
candidate who will protect their interests. Aligning one’s vote with the candidate who represents 
them, either in appearance, background, or just as a mindful representative, is not typically an 
issue. However, when the identity of the group is based on animosity towards another group, 
tensions will rise between the groups.  
Parekh, the author who defines multiculturalism, states that “the sense of belonging 
cannot be ethnic and based on a shared cultural, ethnic, and other characteristics… but must be 
political and based on a shared commitment to the political community” (Parekh, 2000).  In 
Parekh’s analysis of multiculturalism, he shares a similar rhetoric to Fearon’s distinction 
between social relevance and political mobilization: ethnic groups can be socially relevant, but 
should also share a common commitment to the success of the country’s development (2000). 
However, when the ethnic group(s) become politically mobilized, that is when intentions become 
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more malicious and competitive. When ethnic groups form political blocs, the ethnic groups will 
vie to gain power and economic gain.  
A potential reason that one political party may want to stoke tensions with another group 
is to generally gain dominance over another group in a form of revenge. In the case of the Hutu 
and Tutsis, the Tutsis were the ethnic group placed in power by the Belgian and later French 
colonists with no representation of the Hutus. The Hutus then mobilized and exiled thousands of 
Tutsis, made another Hutu president, and were responsible for the killing of twenty thousand 
Tutsis. The Hutu president was then ousted and replaced with a Tutsi president, and the roles of 
the two groups changed: the Hutu were then forced into exile, fleeing to Burundi to avoid 
violence, and were the group victimized by a genocide at the hands of the Tutsis. This conflict 
stemmed from the power struggle between the two ethnic groups in Rwanda and the desire for 
one to have power over the other. Another potential explanation for stoking tensions between 
groups is to gain political power as a party. For example, a nationalist-based party may tout anti-
immigration and racist policies that discriminate against a minority group in the state. When the 
party appeals to an ethnic majority, they are able to mobilize a large percentage of the population 
and take advantage of some of the beliefs that an ethnic group may hold. In times of economic or 
political turmoil, politicians and voters alike look to a group, usually a weaker or smaller one, as 
the cause of their problems. These groups are referred to as scapegoats, which is when blame is 
placed on a group that has nothing to do with the problems that the state is facing. Even if the 
ethnic majority is not necessarily anti-(minority), placing the blame on another group is an easier 
solution that admitting fault in one’s own party. Additionally, being the party in power has its 
benefits: the ethnic majority will likely experience policies that will advance their group, while 
the ethnic minority will experience policies that will slow their progress. The gap between the 
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ethnic majority and minority will grow further, ensuring the ethnic majority will be successful 
through promotion of policies in their best interests and the repression of the ethnic minority. By 
scapegoating an ethnic minority, the state can justify “punishing” them for the problems of the 
state.  
Creating different groups leads to an advantage to the ethnic majority over time, as well 
as the party: when they vote for the party that provides a benefit for their group, they are more 
likely to re-elect the party that is on their side. If the ethnic majority had not been previously 
politically mobilized, it is more likely that they had been indifferent towards the ethnic minority, 
but have since changed their opinions based on the influence by their party. The majority may 
hold animosity towards the ethnic group itself, or at least does not want them to take power in 
the state because it will no longer be beneficial to the ethnic majority and can potentially be 
detrimental. This is similar to the situation we have seen since Indian independence up until 
today between India, Pakistan, and the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the literature review, we 
will take a deeper dive into the nuances of the primordialist and constructivist theoretical lenses, 
as well as review scholarly literature on ethnicity, mobilization, and conflict.  
LITERATURE REVIEW  
Since India’s independence from the British Empire, the state known as Jammu and 
Kashmir located in northwestern India has been a contested area. Both Pakistan and India fully 
claim the state as their own due to disputed geographical borders, but also because Pakistan is a 
Muslim-majority country as is Jammu and Kashmir. Though both countries fully believe the 
territory is theirs, Pakistan and India rule only parts of the state. This is just one case of many 
regarding governments using a hotly-contested area as a political pawn. Kashmir has acted as an 
arena in which political entrepreneurs have used and manipulated ethnic and religious identities, 
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for their own gain. By using ethnic identities in politics, political agents are able to exacerbate 
underlying resentments, anxieties and aspirations in order to enhance their own legitimacy and 
power, building their own base of support through persecution of another ethnic group.  
Identity is what defines a person and how they act. When someone asks, “tell me about 
yourself”, you are likely to answer with something related to your occupation, familial role, 
ethnic group, or anything else that you feel is relevant to the person you are. Identity, as it is 
defined by Seymour and Gallagher Cunningham, is “a social category denoting some 
fundamental and consequential sameness in which an individual is eligible to be a member”, or 
similarly, can be seen as a “‘social radar’ that provides individuals with a point of reference, 
allowing them to situate themselves within a wider group and understand how their membership 
affects them in the social world” (2016). In sum, the way people define and align themselves 
with others is how they find meaning and purpose in life. Having an identity that connects you 
with others gives you a support system and a sense of family that people who do not have 
common identities cannot provide. Specifically, ethnic identity is of special importance to the 
study of politics because it can shape a political party.  
The study of ethnicity, mobilization, and violence is one that cannot be defined by just 
one theoretical lens (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). For this reason, scholars of the subjects tend to 
utilize multiple fields of study, such as psychology and sociology, as well as apply multiple 
international relations theories (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). At the basis of all arguments 
regarding ethnic violence are two main views, primordialism and constructivism. Primordialist 
proponents believe that ethnicity does not change and is distinguishable by certain characteristics 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Perhaps the most important factor in the primordialist belief is that 
because ethnicity is fixed, ethnic tension and violence are unavoidable; however, this point of 
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view has been much disputed by the opposing viewpoint (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). While it is 
important to understand the roots of ethnicity and whether it is fluid or fixed, it is equally as 
important to note how ethnicity becomes relevant, especially in regards to politics. 
Constructivism, on the other hand, does not believe that there are certain characteristics of 
ethnicity and that ethnicity is in fact more fluid than the primordialists believe (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2000). In understanding ethnicity in these two general frameworks, the literature aims to 
address the reasons and the structures behind ethnic tension and violence, and why ethnicity is 
significant in the first place.  
The ongoing discussion over primordialism versus constructivism likely will not end anytime 
soon. Understanding both arguments is crucial for analyzing different case studies of ethnic 
violence, though much of the literature today touts a constructivist point of view. Ethnicity, 
mobilization, and political entrepreneurship create a framework so that we can better understand 
ethnic relations and the reasons for conflict. Using the information in this study, I apply these 
key terms and ideas as outlined above to the case of Kashmir, past and present. As the Kashmir 
situation unfolds, it is impossible to know what the outcome of the conflict will be, but by 
utilizing a constructivist theoretical lens, we can better understand the past and present 
implications of ethnic mobilization and political entrepreneurs.  
ETHNICITY AND ETHNIC MOBILIZATION THEORIES 
Ethnicity becomes salient to politics and conflict when it is mobilized by a feature of 
identity, economic or political motivations, discourse, or by a political actor (Olzak, 1983). Three  
major scholars, sociologist Susan Olzak and political scientists David D. Laitin and James D. 
Fearon describe two different sets of theories regarding ethnic mobilization. Olzak gives a broad 
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overview of the primordialist and constructivist view and does not necessarily pick a stance, 
while Fearon and Laitin are constructivists.  
Olzak, who defines ethnic mobilization as a “collective action that takes some set of 
ethnic markers as criteria for membership”, also lists several other potential measures of ethnic 
mobilization as well (1983). The listed measures are areas of mobilization that have been 
previously researched by other scholars, including collective ethnic behavior, ethnic separatist 
party vote, studies of ethnic conflict, war, and genocide, amongst others (Olzak, 1983). 
Following the constructivist perspective described above, Fearon and Laitin argue that ethnic 
mobilization does not inevitably emerge due to primordial differences but is produced through 
social and economic processes as agents of construction, social construction by discourse, and 
individuals as agents of construction (2000). The social and economic processes that create 
ethnic identity and lead to ethnic mobilization are related to economic modernization. As one 
author cited in the text states, national identity was shaped “as an almost accidental by-product of 
“print capitalism”” (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The second argument for social construction of 
ethnicity that Fearon and Laitin make is that when one ethnic group is identified, it “others” the 
opposing group, which can lead to tension. “Othering” refers to the idea that differentiating 
oneself or one’s group from the rest of society isolates the group as a singular force, rather than a 
part of the community. The “other” in this case is likely to be viewed more negatively due to the 
discourse surrounding the group (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). The final argument for social 
construction Fearon and Laitin make consists of two parts: strategic action by elites, and strategic 
action on the ground. Strategic action by elites refers to producing ethnic violence through the 
creation of antagonistic identities to further their own political pursuits (Fearon and Laitin, 
2000).  This is achieved through recruitment, “the explicit request by political elites for 
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individuals to perform some political act” (Abramson and Claggett, 2001). Political elites will 
only mobilize individuals if it is both beneficial and strategic for their purpose (Abramson and 
Claggett, 2001). Though in Abramson and Claggett’s piece they use political mobilization to 
explain voting behavior and other less nefarious actions, recruitment and mobilization can also 
be used to explain ethnic mobilization and the potential conflict that comes with it. These 
political elites, or entrepreneurs, are a crucial aspect of ethnicity and conflict, as they may use 
these strategies to anger members of another group or nation, provoking them into a larger-scale 
war. Strategic action on the ground refers to the slow development of ethnic identity based on 
repetitive actions by individuals (Fearon and Laitin, 2000). Over time, the actions of a specific 
group of people on a day-to-day basis make up an ethnic group due to their shared similar 
practices. While Fearon and Laitin approach ethnic mobilization from a strictly political lens, 
Olzak approaches the same idea with a sociological framework, largely focusing on economic 
reasons for mobilization.  
Olzak describes in her paper the four major theoretical frameworks of ethnic 
mobilization: developmental theories, internal colonialism and cultural division of labor models, 
economic models of ethnicity, and competitive models. The developmental model theory is 
explained as ethnicity becoming relevant again as a country develops and is a likely outcome 
when the following factors are present: the equal size of ethnic populations residing within a 
state, relatively advanced periphery when compared to ethnically different regions, lack of class 
cleavages and therefore lack of class-based parties, history of peripheral region government, and 
a strong sense of nationalism of one ethnic group producing a corresponding ethnic reaction from 
another group (Olzak, 1983). The internal colonialism model “attempts to explain ethnic 
regionalism (and regional resistance to ethnic assimilation) by applying to within-state settings 
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the core periphery model found in world-systems theory” (Olzak, 1983). Building off of this 
point, when cultural differences collide with differences in development, “cultural and 
economically exploitations are mutually reinforcing” (Olzak, 1983). The cultural division of 
labor comes into play when a labor market is segregated by ethnic and cultural boundaries 
(Olzak, 1983). While ethnicity may vary, workers may have similar economic goals and will 
mobilize based on class instead and by reducing the cultural division of labor “[class solidarity] 
can hypothetically produce a decline in ethnicity” (Olzak, 1983). 
The third theory regarding ethnic mobilization is the economic model, which assumes 
that “economic roles determine the degree to which ethnic solidarity exists” (Olzak, 1983). This 
theory is divided into two separate arguments: the split labor market theory and the segregated 
labor market theory. The split labor market theory postulates that ethnic conflict will peak when 
at least two ethnic groups are competing within the same labor market and request different 
wages (Olzak, 1983). Ethnically divided labor groups can lead to ethnic antagonism, which lists 
racism, lynching, and discrimination, amongst other factors, as examples (Olzak, 1983). 
Segregated labor market theory seeks to explain “the persistence of ethnic boundaries by 
emphasizing the role of specialized economic institutions and network relations in maintaining 
ethnic solidarity” (Olzak, 1983). Though this theory does not fully explain how ethnic solidarity 
can impact ethnic mobilization, there is some research that may show a linkage between the two. 
For example, in some studies, it has been shown that the decline of ethnic solidarity may be 
associated with large-scale ethnic mobilization (Olzak, 1983). 
The final theory that Olzak presents is the competitive model of ethnic mobilization. This 
theory purports that “as ethnic groups come to compete in the same labor markets and increase 
their access to similar sets of political, economic, and social resources, ethnic mobilization will 
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occur” (Olzak, 1983). The competitive model takes a constructivist approach as race and 
ethnicity are defined by “socially attributed” characteristics, considering both behavioral and 
physical aspects (Olzak, 1983). This model incorporates modernization into its consideration of 
ethnic mobilization because as an economy and state modernize, they encourage groups to 
mobilize along larger lines, “rather than along kinship, village, or some other smaller-scale 
boundary” (Olzak, 1983). Such large-scale mobilization naturally points to ethnicity as a 
possibility for mobilization. Therefore, “the competitive theories explain the causal link between 
modernization and ethnic mobilization both in terms of rising levels of ethnic competition and in 
terms of increasing legitimacy of subnational and territorial ethnic movements” (Olzak, 1983). 
Though economic and political modernization does not encourage ethnic mobilization, the 
indirect support may be enough to spur it, which could potentially lead to ethnic violence. In the 
second half of this literature review, we will discuss the potential reasons for violence and 
insurgency and how ethnicity plays a role.   
CIVIL WAR, INSURGENCIES, AND VIOLENCE 
To understand what is causing civil war, violence, and insurgencies, the reader must 
know what we mean by each term. Ethnic violence is defined by Brubaker and Laitin as: 
violence perpetrated across ethnic lines, in which at least one party is not a state 
(or a representative of a state), and in which the putative ethnic difference is 
coded – by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties, or analysts – as having 
been integral rather than incidental to the violence, that is, in which the violence is 
coded as having been meaningfully oriented in some way to the different ethnicity 
of the target (Brubaker and Laitin, 1998). 
 
In sum, ethnic violence can best be described as violence that is motivated by ethnic differences 
and across ethnic lines. There are three main forms of large-scale ethnic violence: (1) communal 
or societal ethnic violence, which refers to ethnic riots, pogroms, feuds, and hate crimes; (2) 
state-led aggression, which includes state-led pogroms, police brutality, oppression by state 
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agents, and state-led/assisted genocides; (3) separatism, which is defined as “where the latter 
seeks greater political autonomy or secession from the state”; and (4), contests or state 
breakdowns, which refers to “violence between ethnic groups seeking control (or increased 
control) of a recognized state apparatus”. Such acts of separatist violence are “associated with 
attempts to secede to establish a separate state, or to join another existing state” (Brubaker and 
Laitin, 1998). Understanding the differences between types of ethnic violence can help 
distinguish the reasons as to why the violence occurred. The first and second type of violence is 
based in hatred towards another ethnic group, and those in power either attempt to oppress or kill 
the weaker group. The third type of violence, however, occurs as a result of oppression and is an 
extreme form of retaliation against the oppressor. The fourth type of violence is a mixture of 
ethnic hatred and a desire to rule the state, seen in cases such as Rwanda. Consistent ethnic 
violence is often present in the form of an insurgency or civil war, as seen in the third and fourth 
type of violence. 
Insurgencies 
 According to Brubaker and Laitin, insurgencies can best be understood by the conditions 
that support insurgencies. These conditions are “largely independent of cultural differences 
between groups and even group grievances” (Fearon and Laitin, 1999). The most important thing 
to know about insurgencies is that they are weak in comparison to the governments they fight; 
however, they are effective because they are able to hide. One hypothesis touted by Brubaker 
and Laitin on the success of insurgents is “the presence of (a) rough terrain, poorly served by 
roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor insurgency and civil war. So 
should the availability of (b) foreign, cross-border sanctuaries and (c) a local population that can 
be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agencies” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). It 
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is also thought that insurgents must have grievances in regards to some form of discrimination 
along the lines of cultural differences as a form of motivation (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
Insurgents are more likely to survive and succeed in their mission when the government is 
relatively weak, defined by factors such as poor finances and organization, corruption, political 
divide, and a large population contributing to lack of information about local politics (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003). Though insurgencies and civil wars have similarities in their practices and 
intentions, they differ in their organizational structure and criteria for being described as either 
an insurgency or a civil war.  
Civil Wars 
Fearon and Laitin use the following criteria to define a civil war:  
(1) they involved fighting between agents (or claimants to) a state and organized, 
nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take 
power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The 
conflict killed at least 1,000 people over its course, with a yearly average of at 
least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians 
attacked by rebels) (2003). 
 
The characteristics of a civil war differ from those of an insurgency as the latter is defined as “a 
technology of military conflict characterized by small, lightly armed bands practicing guerrilla 
warfare from rural bases” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Insurgencies are also characterized by 
indiscriminate and brutal killings, rather than being defined by a finite number of deaths like 
civil wars.  Understanding the difference between civil war and insurgencies, we then explore the 
potential causes of both forms of violence.  
Across many disciplines of research, it has been stated as a fact that ethnically diverse 
societies are more prone to civil war, but according to a dataset analyzed by Fearon and Laitin 
(2003), this statement is false (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The dataset in question includes 161 
countries that had a population of at least 500,000 in 1990 and covers the period of 1945 to 1999 
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(Fearon and Laitin, 2003).  While it may seem logical that a state with ethnic grievances is more 
likely to have a civil war, this is also refuted with quantitative data by Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
Though grievances, along with ethnic hostilities and nationalist sentiments often motivate rebels, 
these categories are too broad to mark where civil war breaks out (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). To 
establish the possible influences on civil war, Fearon and Laitin provide several hypotheses to 
help explain potential reasons for the violence. Regarding the influences behind civil war, Fearon 
and Laitin establish seven hypotheses:  
(1) Measures of a country’s ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with 
a higher risk of civil war; (2) the effect of ethnic diversity on the probability 
of civil war should increase at higher levels of per capita income;(3) Countries 
with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at a greater risk 
for civil war; (4) measures of political democracy and civil liberties should be 
associated with lower risks of civil war onset; (5) policies that discriminate in 
favor of a particular language or religion should raise the risk of civil war 
onset in states with religious or linguistic minorities; (6) greater income 
inequality should be associated with higher risks of civil war onset; and (7) 
among countries with an ethnic minority comprising at least 5% of the 
population, greater ethnic diversity should associate with a higher risk of 
ethnic civil war (2003). 
 
In regards to the first three hypotheses, Fearon and Laitin attempt to find out if there is a 
relationship between ethnicity and civil conflict, like much of the popular literature on ethnic 
conflict claims. They find through the data used that “the estimates for the effect of ethnic and 
religious fractionalization are substantively and statistically insignificant”; when analyzing the 
poorest countries with the highest rates of civil war, more homogenous countries were more 
civil-war prone than less homogenous countries (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Hypothesis four is 
also disproven by the data as the coefficient for democracy was both positive and statistically 
insignificant, indicating that “civil war onsets are no less frequent in democraciesafter 
controlling for income” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). After testing for linguistic or religious 
discrimination (hypothesis five), the authors find no result as discrimination is not associated 
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with higher risks of civil war onset. Hypothesis six, income inequality, is disproved by the Gini 
coefficient estimates of income inequality as they are not statistically significant (Fearon and 
Laitin, 2003). Finally, the authors find that hypothesis seven, similar to hypotheses one through 
three, is also not supported by the data. Using the measures of religious diversity, they find weak 
and inconsistent results, and “support for H7 diminishes further if we code the “partially” or 
“ambiguously” ethnic wars as nonethnic” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Fearon and Laitin do not 
find that any of the typical predictive factors of civil war statistically impact the onset and 
conclude that the prevalence of civil war in the late 20th century is a result of newly decolonized, 
weak, and impoverished states that are more prone to civil violence (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). 
Though this piece came out seventeen years ago, mass media still touts the primordialist idea that 
war and conflict are inevitable in ethnically heterogenous societies. Through an exploration of 
Fearon and Laitin’s work through on the topic, one would see that there is no relationship 
between ethnicity and war.  
We now move into the general history of Jammu and Kashmir to understand the context 
of the case study that follows. 
HISTORY OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
Prior to Indian independence, the British empire ruled the nation and its surrounding 
areas (now Bangladesh and Pakistan) until its official annexation in 1947. In order to gain 
independence, former President Jawaharlal Nehru held the Lahore Congress session in 1929 to 
formalize the pursuance of complete independence from Britain. After this declaration, Britain 
held three Round Table Conferences with India to make a plan for their independence 
(Britannica, n.d.) These meetings led to the Government of India Act of 1935, which allowed for 
an autonomous government. Nehru, the leader of the Congress party, and Mohammed Ali 
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Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League, supported the idea of creating a coalition government. 
However, since Jinnah had not fared well in the polls, the Congress party failed to support Nehru 
in his pursuit, leading to a clash between the two parties. With the refusal to join forces, Jinnah 
and the Muslim League broke off from India and formed the Muslim-majority Pakistan, 
officially separating itself from India and its government (Muhammad Ali Jinnah , 2019) After 
Pakistan became its own country, the northern state of Kashmir became a highly contested area 
and has continued to be an issue even today. The leader of Kashmir at the time, Hari Singh, was 
left to decide which country his principality would join, and he chose India (Britannica, n.d.). 
However, this caused a conflict between the two nations and required the United Nations to step 
in and demand a cease-fire, and Nehru agreed to redraw the line of demarcation to allow for an 
India-controlled side and Pakistan-controlled side (Indian-Pakistan Background, n.d.) Though 
Kashmir identified more with Pakistani culture due to the majority religion of Islam and shared 
common story, it was  treated as a mostly Indian, mostly Hindu state.  
Prior to Jammu & Kashmir’s statehood in 1947, the National Conference Party, the 
secular branch of the Muslim Conference Party, mobilized the Kashmiri people and became the 
progressive party. On the state level, the NC Party secured the autonomous region and negotiated 
for Article 370 to be included in the Indian Constitution under section XXI, temporary 
provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (Chowdhary and Rao, 2004). Article 
370 states that: 
notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, - (a) the provisions of Article 238 
shall not apply in relation to the state of Jammu and Kashmir; (b) the power of 
Parliament to make laws for the said State shall be limited to – (i) those matters in 
the Union List and the Concurrent List, which, in consultation with the 
Government of the States, are declared by the President to correspond to matters 
specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to 
the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion 
Legislature may make laws for that State; and (ii) such other matters in the said 
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Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the State, the President may 
by order specify (National Portal of India, 1948). 
 
Though this article can be removed by the President of India at any time, it gives special 
statehood status and some degree of autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. Though the NC Party 
was able to bring this article into being, they did not gain its reputation for its radical ideals and 
progressivity until the publication of its ideologies in the “New Kashmir Manifesto.” This work 
and ideology aimed to mobilize Kashmiris to create a new, better state: one with a reorganized 
political and economic structure that benefited all, that did not oppress the lower classes or 
women, and abolished feudalism (Chowdhary and Rao, 2004).The work of Sheikh Abdullah, the 
leader of the NC Party, was important in creating the state of Jammu and Kashmir. He is also 
often credited with democratization along with the Congress Party leader Indira Gandhi. 
However, it is important to note other crucial figures of the movement: Balraj Puri, former 
member of the NC Party, Bhim Singh, member of the Panthers Party, and Prime Minister Moraji 
Desai, who ensured free and fair elections through threat of severe punishment in the event of 
electoral rigging (Widmalm, 2004). 
The initial tug-of-war over the state led to hostility and wars between Pakistan and India 
with no input from the people of Jammu and Kashmir as to what they wanted. Though the state 
was semi-autonomous and was granted some special rights that other states were not, Kashmir 
was still oppressed by the Indian government and denied basic democratic rights, such as fair and 
free elections. Since Kashmir did not have the means to mobilize on their own, Pakistan decided 
to step in and assist them in fighting against India using their Islamic militants. This mobilization 
on behalf of the Pakistani government was likely motivated by the potential to finally claim 
Kashmir as a state as well as prove to India that they are the more powerful state. Though India 
was initially a secular democracy, today they have morphed into a religious extremist party, 
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known as the Bharatiya Janata Party which promotes a “Hindu-first” agenda. The oppression that 
Kashmir faced while India was a secular government has only gotten worse since they have 
moved to the Hindu-first agenda, furthering their attempt to stamp out the voices of minorities.   
Jammu and Kashmir enjoyed democracy for only a short time, however, as the legitimacy 
of democracy began to crumble in just five years. The state became aware of the state corruption 
and illegitimate elections, their first experience being through the NC Party and Congress Party’s 
unofficial monarchial system of electing new officials.  
Changes to Leadership and Party 
Prior to his death in 1982, Sheikh Abdullah made his son Farooq heir to the role of leader 
of the NC Party, though the position was originally supposed to go to Mirza Afzal Beg, Chief 
Minister to Sheikh. When Farooq inherited the party, it was already fracturing because “much 
like Indira Gandhi, Sheikh Abdullah allowed the centralized tendencies inherent in dynastic rule 
to assert themselves in his party instead of building a strong and internally democratic apparatus 
firmly anchored in local organizations”. 1 In short, Abdullah had lost the mobilization that had 
made the party so successful in the first place. Sheikh, though a democrat in name, made several 
controversial decisions that negatively impacted the Kashmiri people’s civil liberties, most 
notably through the passage of the Jammu and Kashmir Safety Ordinance. The ordinance placed 
“severe restrictions on newspapers and other publications within the state in the interests of 
security and public order”, and despite backlash from the media, Sheikh moved to make it a legal 
statute (Ganguly, 1997). By this point in Sheikh’s reign, his base grew restless, as “the educated 
Muslim youth whose number multiplied several times in 30 years realized that Sheikh 
Abdullah’s inconsistent behavior had done immense harm to the interests of Kashmiris” through 
 
1 Ibid.  
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the limiting of political and basic human rights, as well as limiting their economic prospects 
(Ganguly, 1997). Though the economy was successful under Sheikh due to support from New 
Delhi, the newly educated Kashmiris were not content to work the trade jobs they typically had; 
instead, they wanted more job growth in new sectors where they could use their educations 
(Ganguly, 1997). This discontent was not only experienced on an individual level, but a 
community level as well. The NC Party had turned into an unrecognizable representative of the 
people, causing restlessness amongst members.  
NC Party members also were discontented due to the organization and changing values of 
the party. What once was the radical, progressive party of Kashmir had morphed into something 
unrecognizable. The NC Party was built on this idea of a new Kashmir, a state that would lift up 
the voices of the oppressed and economically liberate both the state and the people. Yet 
somehow, such ideals had changed, and Sheikh Abdullah instead began stripping crucial civil 
liberties that other Indians still had (Ganguly, 1997). These factors, along with a sudden influx of 
Assamese Muslims to Kashmir after a massacre in the village of Nellie in 1983 and the ethnic 
and military mobilization by the Pakistani president, all contributed to Muslim fundamentalism 
in the Valley for the first time (Ganguly, 1997). 
Mobilization of Kashmir 
To mobilize disenfranchised Kashmiris, Zia-ul-Haq, the president of Pakistan (1978-
1988), “used the Pakistani army’s powerful Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) organization to fund, 
organize, and train young, disaffected Kashmiris imbued with recently discovered Islamic fervor 
to challenge the writ of the Indian state” (Ganguly, 1997). Prior to the Pakistani government 
aiding the Kashmir Valley, President Zia-ul-Haq had reformed the criminal law system in his 
own country in what is referred to as the Hudood Ordinances with the intention of bringing 
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“Pakistan’s legal system closer to the precepts of Islam” (Ganguly, 1997). The Ordinances 
changed how crimes, punishments, and evidentiary requirements were distinguished to align 
them more closely with the Quran and Sunnah (Ganguly, 1997). Of particular interest is the 
uneven implementation of the Hudood Ordinances across the nation. According to author 
Charles H. Kennedy, “fully 80% of the cases tried under the Hudood statutes originated in the 
Punjab, 12% in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), only 7% in Sind, and less than 1% in 
Baluchistan” (Kennedy, 1988). He opines that there are distinct cultural differences between the 
Punjab province, which is mostly urban, and the other regions, which are mostly rural, dictating 
how crimes are handled. Zina-related crimes, which refer to sex, may be handled within families 
and communities in rural areas, while Punjabis are more likely to take such crimes to court 
(Kennedy, 1988). In regards to the case of Kashmir, it is most notable that the Punjab province 
borders the state of Kashmir and both territories have a Muslim majority. When considering the 
recent changes in government and the justice system that President Zia-ul-Haq had made in his 
own country, it is clear to see that he would have a vested interest in mobilizing dissatisfied 
Kashmiri Muslims.  
Secularism and Religiosity  
While it was noted by author Sten Widmalm that it was unclear how much influence 
Pakistan had on Kashmir, Ganguly believes that the Pakistani influence was one of several 
influences regarding the change to Muslim fundamentalism. It is likely that the mobilization and 
training of the Kashmiris by the Pakistani government had a significant impact on the transition 
to Muslim fundamentalism, if only because the people needed an outside force to help them 
mobilize. With the support of the ISI organization and President Zia-ul-Haq, they were able to do 
so effectively and quickly. India as a whole nation, on the other hand, was a secular democracy, 
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so one state beginning to identify at least in part with Muslim fundamentalism was in stark 
contrast to the Indian government. Though India chose to believe there was a distinct difference 
between secular nationalism and religion, scholar Mark Juergensmeyer claims that there is 
actually very little difference between the two.  
When comparing secular nationalism and religion, one can see many similarities: “both 
are expressions of faith, both involve an identity with and a loyalty to a large community, and 
both insist on the ultimate moral legitimacy of the authority invested in the leadership of that 
community” (Juergensmeyer, 1993). A secular government in India was purported to be 
beneficial in two ways: one, that in a Hindu-majority country, those who were marginalized by 
the Hindu caste system – the Muslims and untouchables – would be protected if religion were 
irrelevant in government decisions. However, those who most strongly upheld the idea of a 
secular government were not the bottom of the caste system, but rather the urban, educated elite 
(Juergensmeyer, 1993). By separating religion and government from one another, they could 
avoid “the obstacles that religious loyalties create for a country’s political goals” 
(Juregensmeyer, 1993). Through interviewing people living in a secular government and people 
living in a government fueled by religion, however, Juergensmeyer reports that he heard similar 
sentiments about the pitfalls of secularism from both sides: leaders are selfish politicians who 
have no interest in promoting the welfare of people or betterment of society (1993). Though 
these interviews took place in the 1990s in other parts of India, they still reflect the discontent 
with a secular government and help the reader in understanding what fueled Muslim 
fundamentalism in Kashmir.  
Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi: The Fight for Power 
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Prior to the 1980 election, Sheikh Abdullah introduced the Resettlement Bill which 
allowed anyone who had emigrated from Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan before May 1954 to 
return. From the perspective of the Congress Party, this was seen as a ploy to gain more votes for 
the NC Party. On the other hand, the NC Party claimed that the Congress Party did not want to 
uphold the constitutional rights of former citizens. There were several glaring issues with the 
Resettlement Bill: allowing Pakistani citizens to come back to their former state of Kashmir 
could invite a security issue for not only the state, but also all of India (Ganguly, 1997). Prime 
Minister Gandhi was especially suspicious of Pakistanis’ intentions due to the history of conflict 
between the two states over Kashmir. In the eyes of the state, any resettled Kashmiri had the 
potential to be a terrorist or spy for Pakistan. From a regional standpoint, Kashmir’s counterpart, 
citizens in Jammu, were largely Hindu and Sikh and had settled on former Muslim property and 
feared retaliation from returning Kashmiri Muslims (Ganguly, 1997). The introduction of this 
bill prior to the 1977 election created a rift between the two parties and led to both parties 
contesting all seats in a bid to create a majority (Widmalm, 2004). The bill was passed in 1982 
shortly before Sheikh’s death, but Farooq had already been anointed to take over the party in 
1981 upon his father’s death. In the end, the NC Party won 46 of the 75 seats, the Congress Party 
won 26, and the independents gained only three seats in the election. Despite the controversy and 
discontent within the NC Party, they still gained the majority of seats and few people swayed 
from the party to vote for an alternative candidate.  
At the time, B.K. Nehru was the governor of Jammu and Kashmir as well as the cousin of 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Nehru’s situation became increasingly more complicated as his 
cousin and leader of the country pressured him to remove his second-in-command, Abdullah, for 
being an alleged threat to national security. However, Nehru was fond of Abdullah, and refused 
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to accede to the central government’s requests, ultimately resulting in Gandhi’s decision to 
relocate Nehru to governor of Gujarat and replace him with Jagmohan (Widmalm, 2004). 
While Indira Gandhi had claimed that Abdullah was a threat to national security, would 
invade Pakistan, and that he was actually a member of the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
(a party that supported the independence of the state from both India and Pakistan), there may 
have been other issues that were not addressed (Widmalm, 2004). According to B.K. Nehru, 
Gandhi had made it her goal to remove Farooq Abdullah from power because she believed he 
was behind an incident that occurred at a campaign event where she was harassed. Though she 
could never confirm that Abdullah was behind the attack, she blamed it on him for the rest of his 
political career. Both Nehru and the following governor, Jagmahon, knew her intention to change 
the leadership in Jammu and Kashmir, though she had never explicitly stated it. Another 
potential reason that she wanted to change leadership in the state is because the deterioration of 
state-centered relations could be traced back to Abdullah when he joined the opposition conclave 
at the end of the election cycle (Widmalm, 2004). 
The opposition conclave, headed by the leader of the regional Telugu Desam, T.N. Rama 
Rao, consisted of twenty-four leaders of varying parties to condemn Prime Minister Gandhi’s 
leadership. From the summer of May 1983 to January 1984, the conclave met four times to 
discuss the need for more state autonomy; however, opposition unity failed due to two parties 
splitting from the group (Hardgrave Jr., 1984). Gandhi perceived Abdullah’s disloyalty as yet 
another attack on her leadership. Such a move was unprecedented in Indian politics; the NC 
Party and the Congress Party, though different, typically saw eye to eye and historically 
supported the other. The tension between Abdullah and Gandhi was not a conflict of party 
interests, but rather personal conflicts between the two leaders.  By Abdullah attending 
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opposition conclaves and agreeing to a statement that criticized Gandhi’s power, he was publicly 
displaying distrust in the Congress Party. Such opposition could seriously damage the legitimacy 
and power of Gandhi, especially during an election cycle (Widmalm, 2004).  In addition to 
undermining Gandhi’s power, Abdullah’s attendance was also seen as a ploy to influence 
national politics by drawing Muslim voters away from the Congress Party (Ganguly, 1997). Up 
until this time in India’s brief history as an independent nation, save for 33 months, the Congress 
Party had always been in power (Hardgrave Jr., 1984). However, such power has only been held 
onto by a slim margin, and any defectors could lead to another party ruling India. Perhaps more 
important to Gandhi than the party itself maintaining power is her family maintaining power:  
“she has sought to transform the party into an instrument of personal power and to assure that it 
nurtures no one who might challenge her position as prime minister or endanger the succession 
of her children – first Sanjay, now Rajiv” (Hardgrave Jr., 1984). Gandhi’s belief that Abdullah 
had organized the verbal attack at a political convention, in conjunction with the opposition 
conclaves, ultimately led to her ousting Abdullah in order to protect the party and her family. In 
1983, elections were held in Jammu and Kashmir for the first time since Sheikh Abdullah’s 
death, and Indira Gandhi was determined to win the state. To do so, she sought the support of 
Jammu, the largely Hindu part of the state by attempting to appeal to their similar identities. 
Though the Congress Party was touted as secular, as many of the political parties at the time 
were, Gandhi thought that she may be able to appeal to more people by mobilizing their identity. 
Since religion did not play a large role in Indian politics at the time, PM Gandhi could not try to 
mobilize Kashmir solely on their shared sameness; rather, they emphasized the “alleged 
corruption and economic mismanagement” by the NC Party (Ganguly, 1997).  
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By July 24, 1984, the NC Party lost the majority holding of seats due to the defection of 
thirteen members of the legislative assembly, providing the Congress Party the opportunity to 
remove Abdullah as Chief Minister. It is worth noting that those who led the defection were 
Ghulam Mohammed Shah, the brother-in-law of Abdullah, and Devi Das Thakur, a High Court 
lawyer, and “planned to withdraw support from Abdullah and form a new government with the 
support of Congress” (Widmalm, 2004). In May of 1984 Ghulam Mohammed Shah, the leader of 
the thirteen defectors of the NC Party and the brother-in-law of Abdullah, held what he called the 
“real” NC convention, with Farooq Abdullah holding one of his own several days later. The 
splinter convention hosted by Jagmahon legitimatized the defection of the thirteen members of 
the legislative assembly (twelve NC members and one independent) and the letter of defection 
was signed in June of 1984. (Widmalm, 2004). 
Jagmohan suggested that governor’s rule be implemented since the NC had lost the 
majority, but Abdullah wanted to follow the constitutional proceedings, which allowed for a vote 
of confidence (Widmalm, 2004). According to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution, Article 92 
states that: 
if at any time the Sadar-i-Riyasat [governor] is satisfied that a situation has arisen 
in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the 
provisions of the Constitution, the Sadar-i-Riyasat may by proclamation: (a) 
assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and 
all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by anybody or authority of the 
State; (b) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the 
Sadar-i-Riyasat to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the 
Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the 
operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to the High Court. 
(Kashmir, 1956). 
 
Thakur, the other leader of the defection and the High Court Leader, ruled that what Shah had 
done was legal and democratic, when it fact it was not. Though Shah claimed to be 
uncomfortable with the process and said that he only proposed governor’s rule to oppose the 
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central government, the legitimacy of the constitution had already been called into question by 
the people (Widmalm, 2004). On the other hand, Abdullah was well within his rights to request a 
vote of confidence, but he was denied this by the central government and Jagmahon blindly 
followed the orders of the central government, which many thought was an undemocratic 
response to a standard request. (Widmalm, 2004). 
During Nehru’s reign as governor, there had certainly been some instances of violence 
and curfew implementation; however, January 19th, the day Jagmohan came into power, is often 
regarded as a “watershed moment” for Kashmiris (Bose et al., 1990). On the first day of 
Jagmohan’s governance, illegal searches and raids were conducted by para-military forces and 
four hundred young people were forced out of their homes and beaten, all without the knowledge 
of local civil authorities (Bose et al., 1990). By January 21st, more than 20,000 people had taken 
to the streets to protest, resulting in the additional deaths of at least sixty people, but unofficial 
reports claim up to two hundred deaths (Bose et al., 1990). On the following day, Kashmiris 
again took to the streets to protest, but this time protested the deaths from the previous day. On 
January 22nd, 100 people died in the protest, and survivors interviewed recalled para-military 
forces attempting to block the injured from getting to the hospital (Bose et al., 1990). Jagmahon 
had seemingly no control over the situation, but maintained his power for nearly two years.   
During this time period, Gandhi put Operation Blue Star into effect in the state of Punjab, which 
borders both Pakistan and Kashmir, to fight Sikh extremists. For four days, the battle against the 
Golden Temple raised on, killing the leader, Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale, most of his 
snipers, and hundreds of innocent people. To further prove the strength of the central 
government, Gandhi then enlisted in the help of several newspapers to portray Abdullah as a 
Sikh sympathizer (Schofield, 2003). Because Abdullah had met with Bhindranwale earlier that 
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same year, “Farooq was charged with secretly supporting the Sikh separatists and of permitting 
them to train in the state of Jammu and Kashmir” (Schofield, 2003). Though he and his 
government denied it, Gandhi’s allegations against ultimately led to the defection that lost the 
NC Party its majority in Kashmir.  
  The mounting conflict between India and Pakistan over the state of Jammu & Kashmir 
carried on for years.However, the state and its people had almost no say in the matter because 
they experienced unfair elections and were also considered uneducated people. With the 
assistance of Pakistan, Kashmiri Muslim militants have been able to mobilize against the Indian 
state in an attempt to protect their rights as an autonomous state. Since the 1980s, both India and 
Kashmir have moved from secularism to religious-based politics: India to the far-right, Hindu 
nationalist party, and Kashmir to Muslim fundamentalism. Moving into the case study, we apply 
what we have learned about India, Pakistan, and Kashmir’s history and view the Kashmir 
insurgency through a constructivist lens. 
CASE STUDY 1 
Though India has the largest secular democracy in the world, the country has had to 
combat its deep roots in colonialism, feudalism, and the caste-system (Nanda, 2007). Under 
British rule, the Government of India Act of 1935 emphasized the importance of communal 
representation through politics, namely religious identity (Thakur, 1993). To gain political 
power, religious leaders focused on building followings to ensure a spot in the government. 
Though leaders like Ali Jinnah, known as the father of Pakistan, became well-known as the 
leader of Muslims in a predominantly Hindu area, the religious minorities made up only twenty 
percent of the population of India (Thakur, 1993). Since Hindus made up eighty percent of the 
population, religious minorities feared that Hindus would form a massive voting bloc and 
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effectively present minority representation (Thakur, 1993). According to author Ramesh Thakur, 
one of the main principles of the Indian Constitution is to maintain secularism. Secularism can be 
interpreted and defined in several ways: “equal and due respect for all religions and faiths, 
expressed in Sanskrit as sarva dharma samabhav (let all religions prosper); or separation of the 
state from the church (Thakur, 1993). But in its second meaning secularism militated against the 
historical relationship between state and church in India in both the Hindu and Islamic context” 
(Thakur, 1993). And yet, there is a third form of secularism referred to in Indian politics as 
“positive secularism”. Positive secularism, which was generally against secularism, was 
followed by leftist parties and the Congress Party “which, according to the BJP, was only 
favouring the minorities particularly the Muslims and was hurting the interests of Hindus” 
(Misra, 2018). Though secularism was made to be a fundamental principle of the Constitution, it 
does not explicitly state that all religions will be protected. For this reason, the Constitution also 
has a separate group of rights to ensure religious freedom. 
As an agnostic, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was a key supporter of India being a 
secular country (Rajeskhariah, 1987). To Nehru, secularism was not the absence of religion, but 
rather “his idea of secularism envisaged a political structure in which the individual was not 
subject to any social inequalities imposed by religious sanctions” (Rajeskhariah, 1987). 
Rajasekhariah concludes in his article on Nehru’s commitment to ensuring India would be a 
secular state that “secularism was a practical necessity in India as a solution to the problem of 
religious diversity which was a challenge to her unity, harmony and social stability” (1987). As 
Nehru once described it, “the people of the Indian subcontinent, despite a variety of religions, 
languages, castes, and races, shared an overarching historical and cultural experience and had 
common racial roots in the different regions, that made them all uniquely Indian. Where religion 
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may separate them, language, race, and culture also united them” (Thomas, 2004). India took a 
strong stance on their commitment to secularism for most of their independence, only switching 
to a more religious form of politics with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 1990s. 
Despite this change, India continued its legacy as the largest democracy in the world.  
For most of India’s independence, the separation of church and state was pronounced. 
The National Congress Party and the Congress Party (the two major political parties) had policy 
differences, but mostly supported on another. National elections were free and fair, thanks to the 
efforts of Balraj Puri, former member of the NC Party, Bhim Singh, member of the Panthers 
Party, and Prime Minister Moraji Desai, in addition to the leaders of the NC and Congress Party 
at the time, Sheikh Abdullah and Indira Gandhi. Almost immediately after the democratization 
of national elections in 1952, the legitimacy of elections in Jammu and Kashmir deteriorated. As 
mentioned previously in the first case study, the succession from Sheikh Abdullah to Farooq 
Abdullah was unexpected, as Sheikh not only had a different successor to the position, but 
several other qualified members in his cabinet that could have justly served as his replacement. 
His son Farooq was a doctor of medicine and had no experience in politics, so his appointment 
was rather jarring to those involved in the party. In addition to the change in leadership, a 
combination of several factors contributed to violence in the capital and the mobilization of 
Kashmiris: one, the realization that their state was the only in India to have compromised 
elections; two, the lack of ability to express dissent; and three, the increase in education level 
across the state (Ganguly, 1997). The most important factor in Kashmir’s political development 
and ethnic mobilization was their ability to access both traditional and Muslim education.  
Pakistan’s First Attempt to Mobilize Kashmir 
 36 
 
Prior to the 1970s, Jammu and Kashmir experienced lower rates of literacy and education 
as well as lack of access to mass media, contributing to low political sophistication (Ganguly, 
1996). During the 1960s, a series of events led to the Pakistani military infiltrating the Kashmir 
valley, but perhaps most notably is the initial event that led to the conflict. In 1963, anti-Indian 
riots broke out in the valley “following the theft of a holy relic, believed to be a hair of the 
Prophet Mohammad, from the Hazratbal mosque in Srinagar, the capital city of Jammu and 
Kashmir” (Ganguly, 1996). Pakistan assumed that Kashmir was pro-Pakistan due to the state’s 
defense of Islam and the discontent expressed towards India (Ganguly, 1996). Also contributing 
to Pakistan’s decision to infiltrate the valley was the death of Prime Minister Nehru as it was 
assumed that unity in India would crumble; specifically, Pakistani leaders believed that class, 
caste, and ethnic cleavages would ruin the already tenuous union (Ganguly, 1996). Since 
Pakistani leaders were convinced that Kashmir had turned against India, they were dismayed to 
find that Kashmiris did not revolt, despite their anti-India sentiments. Even though the Kashmiris 
were discontent with India, they “lacked awareness of their political plight and the requisite 
organizational impetus, and therefore did not vigorously challenge the existing order” (Ganguly, 
1996). Though Pakistan gave Kashmiris the perfect opportunity to mobilize and revolt against 
India, they were unable to mobilize due to their lack of political prowess and education. 
However, in the following years, Kashmir gained access to the mass media they had been 
missing out on and improved their overall education. In addition to a forty-three percent increase 
in literacy rates from 1971 to 1981 in the state, there was also an increase in Muslim education, 
through madrassas, a form of Muslim education that emphasizes fundamentalism and radicalism 
(Ganguly, 1997).  
The Muslim Education 
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Part of the increase in Muslim education can be attributed to the influx of Bangladeshi 
Muslim religious teachers in Kashmir due to a massacre in their home village, (Ganguly 1997) as 
well as the Saudi monetary influence on the schools (Nasr, 2001). The Saudis invested money 
into these schools that “use Islamic ideology as a way of creating a very efficient guerrilla army 
with a very clear anti-communist ideology” (Nasr, 2001). A typical madrassa syllabus includes:  
learning of the holy Koran by heart, tajweed (correct pronunciation of Koranic 
verses), tafseer (interpretation of holy scriptures), fiqah (Islamic jurisprudence), 
shariah (Islamic law), ahadis (life and decisions of the holy Prophet on various 
issues brought before him by the faithful), mantiq (philosophy), riazi 
(mathematics) and falakiat (astronomy) and tabligh (spreading the word of God) 
(Bandyopadhyay, 2002). 
 
The interpretation of Islam in the madrassas education is referred to as Wahhabi, which is 
an extreme orthodoxy of the religion that the majority of Muslims do not practice (Nasr, 2001). 
Wahhabi is the same interpretation of the Quran that Al-Qaeda uses, and the Saudi-funded 
madrassas were the same schools that members of the terrorist organization attended (Nasr, 
2001). To understand why this type of Muslim education is significant in Jammu and Kashmir, it 
is important to note that Pakistan, who controls one-third of the contested area, is largely 
Muslim, and India, who controls the other two-thirds of the state, is majority Hindu. Pakistan 
also had moved to a more fundamentalist Muslim rule of law in 1979, and so the mobilization of 
Kashmiri Muslims coincided with this timeline. It is important to emphasize that the religion of 
Islam is not inherently violent or terroristic; however, this particular interpretation of the 
scripture is extremist and reactionary. This sect of Islam is not popular amongst those who 
practice and represents only those who are involved in madrassas. Amongst the people of 
Kashmir, there was a physical and religious disconnect as well: Srinagar, the capital of Kashmir, 
and the surrounding valley is predominantly Muslim; Ladakh (now known as the districts of Leh 
and Kargil), was predominantly Buddhist and Muslim, and Jammu is predominantly Hindu 
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(Ganguly, 1996). Jammu and Kashmir also developed their own separate cultures due to 
geographic boundaries. Jammu and Kashmir are separated by 15,000-feet mountain ranges, and 
Kashmir is separated from the rest of India by the valley (Ganguly, 1996). Because of 
geographic and religious differences, Kashmir and its people did not form a common identity 
with Jammu or India. This isolation from others that may have common interests forced Kashmir 
to form their own regional sub-community with specific concerns (Ganguly, 1996). The lack of 
connection to the state of India likely also had an effect on the feelings of hostility towards the 
state. If Kashmiris had felt connected to India in any way, they may have been less inclined to 
wage an attack on the state.  
The mounting discontent felt by Kashmiri people in regards to the Indian government can 
be attributed to all of the aforementioned reasons: increase in literacy and education, access to 
Muslim education and mobilization, and geographical boundaries. Once Kashmiris recognized 
that the secular politics of the state were working against their interests, they chose to mobilize 
along ethnoreligious lines (Ganguly, 1996). By 1989, “a significant number of the Muslim 
inhabitants of the valley began a movement of protest, which was both an armed struggle and a 
political rejection of their continuing allegiance to the Indian Union” (Schofield, 2003). By 1987, 
the newly educated Kashmiris were aware that the Indian government was taking advantage of 
them by rigging elections to keep the NC Party and Congress Party in power. In 1990, the entire 
state of Jammu and Kashmir was placed under the purview of the Armed Forces Special Powers 
Act, which allows for the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir or the central government to declare 
Kashmir a “disturbed” area (“Kashmir Assembly Election: How Free and Fair?”, 2003). A 
disturbed area or state requires military intervention to prevent “activities involving terrorist 
acts” or “activities directed toward disclaiming, questioning, or disrupting the sovereignty and 
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territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of  the territory of India or 
secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian 
National Flag, the Indian National Anthem, and the Constitution of India” (Refworld, 2012). 
There were more than 55,000 security officers involved in polling duty during the 1990 election 
(“Kashmir Assembly Election: How Free and Fair?”, 2003). Besides the National Congress and 
Congress parties, two other parties emerged: the BJP and the Muslim United Front. Unsure of 
their ability to win fairly, the National Congress Party and the Congress Party “weighed down 
potential rivals, specifically the MUF, arresting many of its leaders and workers before the 
polling and after for vaguely termed “antinational activities”.  
The Muslim United Front gained notoriety and was able to contest the elections. 
However, speaking out against the two most powerful parties in the country had its 
consequences: “political activists linked to the MUF were imprisoned without bail for months 
under the draconian Public Safety Act (PSA) and treated inhumanely” (Mohanty, 2018). This 
only gave the MUF and its supporters more reasons to be upset with the national leadership, and 
so many of those activists imprisoned led the Kashmir insurgency once released (Mohanty, 
2018). Prior to these incidents, the state of India did not recognize the desires of different 
political parties or groups in Kashmir, catering mostly to the needs of the National Congress 
Party members and Congress Party members, as those were the two main political parties in 
power in the state. According to Mohanty, the 1989 insurgency was a result of “the state’s failure 
to reconcile informal and formal nationalisms led to inaudible sub-state spheres of representation 
and finally the bursting forth of these inaudible sub-state spheres into full-blown secessionist 
movement in the event of an over-politicized state repressing democratic opposition” (Mohanty, 
2018). These sub-state spheres of representation that Mohanty refers to are the geographically 
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and religiously divided groups within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since different regions of 
the state formed their own cultures and identities, the Kashmiri groups felt disconnected from 
others in the state or people who shared a similar religious background because they felt that 
their issues were not the same. Therefore, they formed their own sub-groups to air their different 
grievances. However, as these groups became more and more fractionalized, their grievances 
became less able to be heard as they lacked representation on a grand scale. Though the groups 
had different needs, they did share at least one common goal: standing up to the Indian national 
government. This event, better known as the insurgency, serves as a catalyst for the current day 
tension between India and Kashmir, as the insurgency displaced thousands of Hindu people and 
disrupted the total control Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had over the country.  
The Kashmir insurgency began in 1989 when the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front 
kidnapped Dr. Rubaiya Sayeed, the daughter of the Indian Minister of Home Affairs (Ganguly, 
1996). The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is responsible for internal security, border patrol, 
center-state relations, administration of Union Territories, management of Central Armed Police 
Forces, amongst other objectives. Knowing the responsibilities of the MHA, targeting Dr. 
Sayeed was not a random act, but a calculated plot to wage a conflict with the state.  
Additionally, Dr. Sayeed was used as collateral in the release of imprisoned members of the 
JKLF, resulting in their freedom just a few days later (Ganguly, 1996). Following the release of 
Dr. Sayeed and JKLF prisoners, insurgencies broke out across the Kashmir Valley, killing 
anyone in their path: government officials, security, and passersby alike (Ganguly, 1996). When 
the Soviet Union released many of their weaponry after the Cold War to Kashmir and Pakistan, 
the Kashmiri independence movement took on a more Islamist ideology (Peace Direct, n.d.). 
Approximately 100,000 Kashmiri Pandits fled the valley and headed south towards Jammu to 
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protect their lives (Essa, 2011). While the head of the KPSS, an organization that protects the 
rights of the remaining Kashmiri Pandits, claims that approximately 650 Kashmiri Pandits were 
killed, other reports claim up to 4,000 deaths (Essa, 2011). In total, it is reported that 34,000 
people were killed between 1978 and 1990 (Peace Direct, n.d.). In response to the violence 
against the Pandits, the Indian government retaliated and engaged in the conflict as well.  
Though there were numerous groups “of varying ideological orientations, all the insurgent 
groups professed opposition to Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir, and the authority of the 
Indian state virtually collapsed there” (Ganguly, 1996). Ganguly explains that this particular case 
of insurgency demonstrates that from a theoretical standpoint, states will face grave danger when 
faced with institutional decay and political mobilization (Ganguly, 1996). The theoretical 
framework explained above also holds policy significance: “as economic modernization 
proceeds, growing levels of literacy, higher education, and media exposure will contribute to 
increased political mobilization” (Ganguly, 1996). These improvements, along with those cited 
in Fearon and Laitin’s paper, help to explain how Islamic militants in Kashmir were able to 
mobilize against Hindus in the state.  
Ethnicity and Insurgency 
 One of the studies analyzed in the literature review can also be applied to the case of 
Kashmir.   Conducted by Fearon and Laitin, they explore ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war 
through eleven hypotheses, several of which are relevant to the case of Kashmir and will be 
discussed here. The first hypothesis that the authors propose is that “measures of a country’s 
ethnic or religious diversity should be associated with a higher risk of civil war”; however, they 
later reject this hypothesis (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This idea is what much of civil conflict and 
war is based upon, including the case of Kashmir. Because Kashmir is majority Muslim and 
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Jammu and the rest of India is majority Hindu, a common assumption made is that the reason for 
the conflict is based in religious contention. While their conflicting ideologies are at play in the 
present day, this has not always been true of the relationship between the nation and the state. 
The ethnic and religious diversity in India does not play into the conflict between Kashmir and 
India.  In fact, the National Congress Party, the ruling party of India, was a secular party and the 
BJP, the Hindu-nationalist party of today, hardly won any seats before the 1990s. The conflicts 
between the two were established far before ethnicity became relevant in India, so Fearon and 
Laitin’s hypothesis is also rejected in this situation. This hypothesis ties into the next one in the 
paper, which states that “countries with an ethnic majority and a significant ethnic minority are at 
a greater risk for civil war” (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). While the ethnicity of Kashmiris is 
convoluted due to former colonization of India and Pakistan, Kashmiris share a common religion 
with Pakistan and feel that they identify more with Pakistanis. This is especially obvious as the 
tension between the Indian state and the state of Kashmir grows, mounting after a stolen Muslim 
artefact was traced back to India. Though the main conflict between the state and nation did not 
originally stem from their ethnic differences, it did play a small part based on demographics and 
potential mobilization from the neighboring nation of Pakistan.  
 Unrelated to ethnicity, Fearon and Laitin hypothesize that “the presence of (a) rough 
terrain, poorly served by roads, at a distance from the centers of state power, should favor 
insurgency and civil war. So should the availability of (b) foreign, cross-border sanctuaries and 
(c) a local population that can be induced not to denounce the insurgents to government agents”. 
(Fearon and Laitin, 2003). The state of Kashmir has all three of these characteristics. Firstly, 
Kashmir is home to the westernmost part of the Himalayas whose foothills reach up to 7,000 feet 
in the state. There are also numerous valleys and other mountain ranges that make travel in the 
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region difficult for most, but ideal for insurgents. Mountainous and familiar terrain aids in 
insurgents’ ability to quickly go into hiding and spread their forces out. Since the opposition, in 
this case the Indian government, is not as familiar with the Himalayan mountain range, seeking 
out the insurgents becomes more difficult. Secondly, Kashmir borders Pakistan, a foreign and 
cross-border sanctuary because the country is sympathetic towards the insurgency due to their 
shared opposition towards India and their propensity for Islam. Finally, the local population can 
be induced not to report back to the state because the Hindu minority in the state would likely be 
threatened, while the Muslim population would support the cause or at the least remain silent. In 
regards to the third part of the hypothesis, the authors expand on this idea in a separate piece 
explaining the reasons non-rebels provide support to rebels. Fearon and Laitin cite that non-
rebels may support rebels in the hopes that they will be able to put pressure on the government to 
make valuable changes, provide a sense of gratification for supporting a group that is actively 
against the state, and protect themselves from rebels who may attack unsupportive locals (Fearon 
and Laitin, 1999). Prior to the beginning of the insurgency between Kashmir and India, a small 
series of skirmishes broke out along the border dividing Kashmir from Pakistan to test the Indian 
government’s reaction. This was also likely a test to see how the terrain could work in the favor 
of the insurgents, though it is not confirmed in literature.  
 Additionally, the following hypotheses from Fearon and Laitin is applicable to the case of 
Kashmir:  
the political and military technology of insurgency will be favored, and thus civil 
war made more likely, when potential rebels face or have available the following: 
(a) a newly independent state, which suddenly loses the coercive backing of the 
former imperial power and whose military capabilities are new and untested; (b) 
political instability at the center, which may indicate disorganization and 
weakness and thus an opportunity for a separatist or center-seeking rebellion; (c) a 
regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features, as this is likely to indicate 
political contestation among competing forces and, in consequence, state 
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incapacity; (d) a large country population, which makes it necessary for the center 
to multiply the layers of agents to keep tabs on who is doing what at the local 
level and also, increases the number of potential recruits to an insurgency for a 
given level of income; and (f) foreign governments or diasporas willing to supply 
weapons, money, and training (Fearon and Laitin, 1999). 
 
India became independent from the British Empire in 1947, making it a new state. Prior to the 
insurgency in Kashmir, India had been involved with several other wars since their 
independence, all between India and Pakistan or India and China. India and Pakistan were both 
ruled by the British Empire, and once the two countries were split due to their religious 
differences, Kashmir became a hotly contested area. At the beginning of the two countries’ 
independence, the ruler of Kashmir was Hindu, but sixty percent of the population was Muslim, 
causing the initial conflict over which country should rule Kashmir (Horimoto, 2005). Since 
India’s inception, the country has been in four wars, one with China over a northeast territory of 
India, two with Pakistan over Kashmir, and one with Pakistan over Bangladesh (Horimoto, 
2005). The wars between Pakistan and India are particularly significant in understanding the 
Kashmir conflict because of the two nations’ differing ideologies. The founding of Pakistan was 
based on the two-nation theory, which “maintained that as long as two ethnic groups existed in 
British India under British Rule, namely, Hindus and Muslims, then it was logical that two 
nations be created” (Horimoto, 2005). This theory then supported the idea that Kashmir, a 
majority Muslim state, belonged under the rule of Pakistan. However, since the Indian National 
Congress Party made secularism the focal point of national unity; including a state that is 
majority Muslim in a majority Hindu country upholds the idea of ethnic homogeneity instead of 
supporting the two-nation theory (Horimoto, 2005).This tension between the two countries 
contributes to future events, specifically the Kashmir insurgency.  
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At the beginning of the conflict, Pakistan infiltrated insurgents into Indian territories in an 
“effort to jump-start the flagging insurgency in Kashmir” (Jaffrelot, 2004). Though India had 
suspected that Pakistan was mobilizing young Islamic men to stage an insurgency, their initial 
infiltration all but proved their position. Before Pakistan stepped in to help mobilize the Jammu 
and Kashmir Liberation Front, the group was disorganized and lacking a plan. Once Pakistan 
began giving assistance to the JKLF (see the foreign government argument of Fearnon and 
Laitin’s hypothesis), they were able to prove a serious threat to India. Combining the arguments 
on political instability, a democratic/autocratic regime, and population size of Fearnon and 
Laitin’s hypothesis, the Indian government and the National Congress Party was run by the 
Gandhi family, namely Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Though India is a democracy, Gandhi 
applied some autocratic features to her regime, such as suppressing voters in the North and doing 
anything possible to keep the NC Party in power. As seen in the background section, Farooq 
Abdullah was punished for joining a group that harshly criticized the prime minister. Though 
Farooq was a member of the Congress Party and not the NC Party, the two had always worked 
together and so Gandhi took this as a personal attack. The insecurity of the Prime Minister 
regarding both her power and her party’s power indicates a level of instability within the national 
government, making them vulnerable to the Kashmiri insurgency. Additionally, as the largest 
democracy in the world, boasting a population of one billion people, it is impossible for the state 
to know the whereabouts and intentions of every one of its states or citizens. Given the distance 
between the capital and Kashmir, the central government is somewhat detached from the north, 
providing the opportunity for Kashmiri insurgents to mobilize before the national government 
can react.  
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For the first three decades of India’s independence there were two major parties in 
Kashmir, the National Conference Party and the Congress Party. Both parties were secular, 
meaning they were not defined by a religious or ethnic identity and solely relied on their politics 
to win elections. During elections, the seats were hotly contested, but only for the two major 
parties. In 1981, even amongst a major rift between the parties over the Resettlement Bill, the 
two political parties took nearly all of the seats. While the NC Party won 46 of the 75 seats and 
the Congress Party won 26, only three of the votes went to independent candidates (Ganguly, 
1997). Since the 1980s, there has been a major shift in political ideology and party leadership, as 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is now “the richest, largest, and most dominant political party in 
India” (Misra, 2018). To gain votes at the beginning of the party’s rise to power, Advani, the BJP 
president, “used the Hindutva rhetoric of “pseudo secularism” and “Muslim appeasement” to 
great effect in winning popular support among the Hindus, aided by the soft-Hindutva politics 
the Indian National Congress played then” (Misra, 2018). “Hindutva” combines the Hindu past 
“by recalling great warriors like Rana Pratap and shivaji who fought against the ‘oppressive’ 
Muslim emperors in the seventeenth century”, but also supports the Western opinions of 
capitalism (Yajnika and Sheth, 2005). There is no one agreed upon definition of Hindutva, but 
Misra explains its origin use as “making Hindus strong and militant by asserting that Hindu 
interest is national interest” (Misra, 2018). In addition to the return to the Hindutva agenda, the 
BJP found support because “the electorate wanted a change from the long years of Congress 
rule”, and the BJP proved to be a legitimate alternative to the Congress party (Misra, 2018). 
Around the same time that Hindutva became mainstream in the 1980s, The term 
“Kashmiriyat” became relevant to the public as well, popularized by Farooq Abdullah for the 
National Congress Party (Tak, 2013). Kashmiriyat is Kashmiri nationalism, and the term was 
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spread by Sheikh Abdullah promoting it through mass media, “political rallies, populist appeals 
for land reform and political equality, and religious sermons” (Arakotaram, n.d.) Instead of 
mobilizing along religious lines, Abdullah intended for Kashmiriyat to mobilize along ethnic 
lines to unite the people of the valley; however, a common ethnicity did not exist (Arakotaram, 
n.d.) The Kashmiri Liberation Front (KLF), employed the philosophy behind Kashmiriyat in 
recruiting supporters, “declaring that the minorities ‘should realize that this [support to 
separatism] is the only way of preserving their own existence and culture of which they are so 
fond of’” (Tak, 2013). Author Arakotaram argues that Kashmiri nationalism is built on Roger 
Smith’s theoretical framework, the people-building model. The people-building model is based 
on three assumptions: “political communities are neither natural nor primordial, political 
communities are constructed by elites who articulate and institutionalize conceptions of political 
peoplehood, and both leaders and citizens have considerable flexibility in the type of people-
building they advance and support” (Arakotaram, n.d.) The case of Kashmir provides the perfect 
example for the people-building model, as both India’s and Pakistan’s government were able to 
mobilize people to advance their own personal goals. As mentioned previously, India had always 
been a secular government until the people tired of the reign of the Gandhis and sought out a new 
party. By amplifying the soft Hindutva policies of the National Congress Party, the BJP was able 
to mobilize voters and get them to stand behind their harsh, extremist policies that promoted an 
“India-first” attitude. The India-first attitude, of course, did not include lower-castes, and 
especially not Indian Muslims. The idea behind Hindutva was to promote the interests of Hindus 
first and foremost, which is also the focus of the BJP. Kashmiriyat came about due indirectly to 
the role of Pakistan in mobilizing and training young Islamic insurgents to rise against the state. 
The traditional and Muslim education that Kashmiris received not only gave them the resources 
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necessary to become politically engaged, but it also gave them a sense of community through 
religion. Kashmiriyat was used primarily as a term of sub-nationalism, however, it was also used 
to create a distinction between Kashmir and the rest of the Indian state, who promoted Hindutva.  
CONCLUSION 
What does a future for Kashmir look like? In 2019, India revoked Article 370, stripping 
Jammu & Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. The Indian government also shut off the 
internet in Kashmir for seven months, beginning in August of 2019 while limited internet access 
was available for Jammu (BBC World News, 2020). The “blackout”, as it is commonly referred 
to, has been received poorly by the rest of the world (BBC World News, 2020). As the supposed 
largest democracy in the world, cutting off the internet and phone access of its citizens is seen as 
an act more indicative of a dictatorship. Among the thousands of Kashmiris placed under house 
arrest, two of these victims of the state were Farooq Abdullah and former chief minister, Omar 
Abdullah under the Public Safety Act (BBC World News, 2020). In the latest news, journalists 
are fearful to continue their professions as they are being threatened by Indian law enforcement 
for supposedly supporting terrorism (BBC World News, 2020). One of the most controversial 
reports to come out of Kashmir in the present-day is the passing of the Citizenship Amendment 
Bill, which allows those religious minorities from neighboring countries to seek refuge in India 
(Perrigo, 2019). The religious minorities included in the bill are Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, 
Parsi, or Buddhist; however, even Muslims minorities who have faced persecution in other 
countries are not included, though they may be considered on a case by case basis (Perrigo, 
2019). Though the bill does not persecute Muslims in their own country, “opponents are also 
concerned that the Citizenship Amendment Bill undermines India’s constitutionally mandated 
secularism, and could make it easier for Muslims within India to be thrown in prison and even 
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deported if they cannot prove their Indian citizenship” (Perrigo, 2019). Such news reports being 
released about the largest democracy in the world are not what the rest of the world would expect 
from India; it is something that most would associate with the governments of China, North 
Korea, or Russia. The potential for Kashmir to gain independence from India or become a part of 
Pakistan does not look bright. For those just tuning into the strife in southeast Asia, it may be 
assumed that this conflict was doomed to occur because of the differences in religion, yet the 
history of India and Kashmir tells a different story. India and Pakistan have both used their 
power to construct new identities for their people in order to pursue a political agenda. We can 
view both the past and present events in Kashmir through a constructivist lens: first through the 
mobilization of Kashmiri Muslims, and now through the mobilization of Indian Hindus.  The 
pseudo-democratic practices that India pursued against the interests of Kashmiris decades ago 
have led up to this moment in history. The only difference now is India is openly rejecting their 
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